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Executive Summary 
Over the past 20 years the incidence of relative poverty among Britain’s children has tripled. 
These changes are related to increased earnings inequality, growth in the number of single 
(lone) parent households, and an increased share of households with children with no working 
adult. The Labour Government has responded by adopting as a policy objective ending child 
poverty by 2020.  Initial steps toward this end include increasing direct financial support to 
families with children, creating financial incentives for work for parents, adopting more 
intensive case management for the welfare caseload, and ameliorating the long-term 
consequences of the deprivation poverty brings.  The Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) is 
the centerpiece of the financial support innovations but there is a broader swathe of welfare 
reforms which has received less attention.  Overall, the U.K. system provides more generous 
support to the lowest-income families than is available in the U.S., and recent reforms have 
directly reduced child poverty.  For most households, the reforms have reduced marginal benefit 
deduction rates and increased incentives to work. Preliminary evidence suggests the changes 
have had greatest effect on single parents.  Continued progress requires the adoption of a more 
specific procedure for defining and measuring child poverty.   - 1 -
 
Eradicating Child Poverty in Britain: 
Welfare Reform and Children since 1997 
Mike Brewer and Paul Gregg 
‘‘Our historic aim will be for ours to be the first generation to end child poverty.’’ 
(Tony Blair, Beveridge Lecture, 1999) 
Perhaps the most ambitious commitment made by the current U.K. Labour Government 
is its stated intention to eliminate child poverty within a generation—defined as 20 years.  In this 
paper we review the concerns that led to adoption of this goal, and we summarize the welfare 
reform strategy developed to achieve it.   We explore in more detail the elements of the strategy 
that directly increase families’ incomes and compare various components with their equivalent in 
the U.S.  We present micro-simulation evidence on the likely first-round effects of the financial 
changes and the limited statistical evidence on program effects that are currently available.  We 
then look at the future developments that the Government has announced or has proposed but not 
yet implemented.  The paper is concluded with a short discussion of what we see as the strengths 
and weaknesses of the Labour program. 
BACKGROUND 
 Labour’s child poverty initiative is motivated by the general rise in inequality in the 
U.K. over the last twenty years and in particular the deterioration in the circumstances of 
Britain’s children relative to other groups.  The Prime Minister’s pledge to end child poverty has 
not been formally translated into a specific numeric target, as there is no official standard 
poverty definition in the U.K.  However, the government currently produces a range of 
indicators covering relative incomes, absolute incomes, deprivation, and worklessness, all of   - 2 -
 
which are related to child poverty (Dept. of Social Security, 2000b).  The most commonly used 
U.K. standard, and the preferred indicator of poverty in the European Union, identifies as poor 
those households with incomes (adjusted for household size) less than 60 percent of the national 
median income.  Income is adjusted (“equivalised”) for household composition
1 and is calculated 
before and after subtracting housing costs.  Special attention is accorded housing costs because 
of problems posed by regional variation and comparing expenses for homeowners and renters.  
Using the after-housing-costs benchmark, 4.2 million (33 percent) of Britain’s children were 
living in relative poverty in 1998.  This was up from 1.7 million (14 percent) in 1979.   In 1998, 
this benchmark corresponded to annual disposable incomes after deducting housing costs of 
£8,717 and £10,289 for a couple with (respectively) one and two children.   In 1999, the official 
U.S. poverty standards for the same families were $13,423 and $16,895. 
The Changing Economy 
The situation facing children is in part the product of a number of changes in the British 
social economy over the past two decades that have affected the ability of working-age adults to 
secure incomes above poverty levels.  Four are particularly important: a growth in workless 
households, an increase in earnings inequality, a reduction in earnings mobility, and an increase 
in the wage reduction that accompanies unemployment spells.  While evidence on these trends 
has accumulated since Labour policy was originally formulated, the changes were already 
apparent when the main policies were being formulated both before and after the 1997 general 
election.  The importance attached to this information is apparent in a number of HM Treasury 
publications, in particular HM Treasury (1997), which analyzed developments in the labor 
market, and HM Treasury (1999a), which focused on poverty dynamics and life-chances. 
                                                 
 
1 The McClements scale is used to for household size.  The scale uses a couple with no children as a reference 
household, and adjusts incomes of households with different compositions.  There is no agreement on what the right 
equivalence scale should be.  As is the case for the U.S. poverty line, the main advantage of the McClements scale is 
consistency: the U.K. Government and academics have used it for over 20 years (these issues are explored further in 
Banks and Johnson, 1993).    - 3 -
 
Workless Households.  Britain has one of the highest employment rates among developed 
nations, with 75 percent of working age adults in work (broadly comparable to the U.S.).  This 
aggregate employment rate has changed very little since 1979.  Nevertheless, the share of 
households with at least one working age adult but no person employed has grown sharply.  
Between 1979 and 1999 the incidence of worklessness among this group of households more 
than doubled, increasing from 8 to 17 percent (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996 and 2000b).  Over 
the same period, the number of households where all adults are in work has increased. Gregg and 
Wadsworth (2000b) show that about a quarter of this change is due to a shift in household 
structure toward more single adult households.  The rest is due to a polarization of work among 
households of a given size, producing both more workless and more fully employed households.  
Earnings inequality.  While income in the United Kingdom is more equally distributed 
than in the U.S., earnings inequality has been growing.  Among developed nations over the 
period 1979 to 1995, the U.K. was second only to the U.S. in the absolute increase in the ratio of 
the 90
th earning percentile to the 10
th (OECD, 1996).  Male wage inequality continued to grow in 
the U.K. after 1990, but at a slightly slower rate than in the 1980s.  Since 1996 wage inequality 
has changed little (Tables A28 - A33, Office of National Statistics, 2000; for more detail and 
interpretation, see Machin, 1999 or Gosling, Machin and Meghir, 2000).  
Earnings mobility.  Among those employed in consecutive years, the extent of mobility 
up and down the earnings distribution fell sharply between 1978 and 1994.  For example, 29 
percent of men in the second lowest earnings decile in 1979 were still there a year later.  By 
1988, this measure of the persistence of earnings had risen to 37 percent (Dickens, 1999, p. 218). 
Cost of Job Loss.  Men flowing onto unemployment-related benefits return to work on 
lower wages than in their previous jobs. They also remain on lower wages for a sustained period 
after returning to work.  Nickell et al (1999) define the “permanent cost of job loss” as the gap 
between pre-unemployment wages and the wage between 2 and 3 years after the unemployment 
spell. They estimate that between 1982-86 and 1992-97 that this permanent cost of job loss rose 
from 11 percent to 20 percent for prime age men.  Gregg and Wadsworth (2000a) uses the series 
of short panels contained in the Labour Force Survey to look at the relative wages of people   - 4 -
 
returning to work after a spell of out of work (unemployment or inactivity).  Real wages in these 
“entry jobs” grew by 20 per cent less than those for other workers with similar observable 
characteristics between 1980 and 1997.  This gap was partially explained by rising returns to job 
tenure and increased concentration of the entry jobs in low pay industries. What is more, job loss 
is not evenly distributed across the labor force: rather, it falls disproportionately on the lower 
paid.  The lowest paid tenth of men are twice as likely to be not earning a year later than those in 
the middle of the earnings distribution (Dickens, 1999).  So low-paid workers are more at risk 
from job loss, and over the last twenty years the wage penalty accompanying job loss has 
increased 
Taken together, the rise in earnings inequality, declining wage mobility, the close link 
between job loss and low earnings, and a growing polarization of work across households 
suggest that lifetime earnings inequality may have risen even faster than the inequality evident in 
conventional cross-sectional measures.  In addition, reforms to taxation and welfare benefits over 
this twenty-year period made the system less progressive (Johnson and Webb, 1993).  As a 
result, the secondary redistribution of income through the tax and benefit system has diminished. 
 These developments contributed to the general increase in inequality and poverty, but the 
growth in poverty among children has been especially marked.  
 Poverty and Worklessness in Households with Children  
Over the last twenty years, children have replaced pensioners as the poorest group in 
U.K. society.  While average incomes of the elderly rose in real terms, even among the poorest 
fifth, the poorest fifth of children in 1996 were in households with incomes no different in 
absolute terms than those reported for the corresponding group in 1979.  Figure INCDIST shows 
how incomes for households containing children in the U.K. have fallen relative to others, such   - 5 -
 
that a large spike has formed in the income distribution below the relative poverty line.
2  
[Figure INCDIST about here] 
In the late 1990s, this relative poverty during childhood was almost evenly split between 
in-work poverty—where there is an earner in the household—and workless poverty– where there 
is no working adult present.  In 1996, nearly 1 in 5 children lived in households where no adult 
worked, up from 7 percent in 1979 and 4 percent in 1968 (Gregg, Harkness, and Machin, 1999).  
Ninety per cent of these children were in the poor households that make up the bulk of the 
observed spike in Figure INCDIST.  The U.K. is way out of line with other developed nations 
with respect to the numbers of children living in workless households: Twenty  percent of 
children in the U.K. lived in workless households in 1996; in the country with the next worst 
record, Ireland, it was 15 percent, and in all other European countries it was 11 percent or less 
(OECD, 1998, p.12).  In the U.S., working poverty is more common, and even before the current 
emphasis on getting people off welfare, only 1 in 10 children lived in a household where no adult 
worked (OECD, 1998 and Dickens and Ellwood, 2000).  
Around a quarter of children living with two parents were in poverty in 1996, up from 1 
in 10 in 1979, and they made up just under 60 percent of children in relative poverty (Gregg, 
Harkness and Machin, 1999).  Over the same period, there has been a marked shift in the 
proportion of children living with a lone parent from around 10 percent to 22 percent.  Poverty 
rates for these children has also risen: from one in three to two in three over the last twenty 
years.  This sharp rise in poverty rates was driven both by a decline in employment among lone 
parents and an increasing propensity not to live with other relatives.  In 1979, under 40 percent 
of lone parents lived in a workless household.  This rose to peak at over 60 percent in the early 
1990s, but has fallen back somewhat since.  Considered together, the rise in the number of lone 
                                                 
 
2  Kernel density techniques take a moving window of a certain width rather than the discrete windows used in a 
histogram (£10 was used here).  This gives a smoother profile than a histogram, and can sometimes help make   - 6 -
 
parent households, the growth in the number of workless couples, and an increase in the 
likelihood of lone parents to be workless all contributed to the growing number of children in 
workless households.   
Comparative studies suggest that the U.S. has greater levels of poverty on a within-
country relative income measure, but on an absolute measure —like the U.S. official poverty line 
— the U.K. has greater poverty amongst children because living standards are lower.  For 
example, on a common relative poverty definition (50 percent of mean income before taxes and 
housing costs, adjusted for family size as in the U.K.) Dickens and Ellwood (2000) estimate that 
the U.S. whole-population poverty rate rose from 25 percent in 1979 to 32 percent in 1999, while 
in the U.K., it rose from 11 percent to 26.  But Bradbury and Jantti (1999) estimate that 29 per 
cent of U.K. children were living on incomes below the U.S. poverty line in 1995, compared to 
an estimated 19 per cent of U.S. children. When compared to poverty for other groups and to 
child poverty in other European countries (Jenkins et al, 2000), the poverty of British children 
appears to be more persistent—those poor today are more likely to be poor tomorrow than is true 
elsewhere. 
The Impact of Deprivation   
The use of a poverty measure based on relative income presents both advantages and 
problems.  Among the problems, perhaps the most serious is that rising living standards and 
rising poverty rates can occur simultaneously.  To ameliorate this problem, the U.K. and 
European literature on poverty also regularly looks at direct measures of deprivation that 
accompany low income (an example is Gordon et al, 2000).  Indeed, the Irish government has 
recently adopted an official poverty measure that incorporates both relative low income and 
measured deprivation (see Nolan and Whelan, 1996, for the theory, and Callan et al, 1999, for 
the practice).  There has been a growing acceptance among U.K. policy makers of the 
proposition that childhood deprivation has longer-term consequences, and this was probably 
crucial in the assembling the political will to address childhood poverty.  That children growing 
                                                                                                                                                             
patterns clearer. Cowell et al. (1996) give greater detail and the picture for the U.K. population as a whole.   - 7 -
 
up in deprived households and communities do less well in terms of life chances has long been 
documented, but such cross-sectional correlations may reflect a range of possible causal 
linkages.  More recently, a literature has emerged that suggests that financial deprivation has an 
identifiable impact on educational attainment, wages, employment rates and other social 
outcomes in adulthood even after controlling for child ability and aspects of family background.  
The U.K. literature relies mainly on the birth cohorts of the National Child Development 
Survey of 1958 and the British Cohort Study of 1970 (Gregg and Machin, 2000a, 2000b; 
Hobcraft, 1999; Hills, 1999, contains a useful summary).  These surveys follow children from 
birth through to adulthood, giving a wider range of individual child and family characteristics 
than is common in other available evidence.   However, these studies do not control for any 
residual unobserved family or child heterogeneity, so the estimated impact of financial 
deprivation may still be biased upwards. It is also not possible to tell conclusively whether the 
effects of deprivation identified by the studies—some of which relate to childhoods in the 
1960s—are associated with relative or absolute deprivation. Perhaps as influential was the U.S. 
evidence that child-based interventions can make a difference to child outcomes for a range of 
deprived children.  Evidence that the Head Start program (see Currie and Thomas, 1995) or the 
Abercedarian Project (see Ramey and Ramey, 1998) made substantive differences to child 
development suggests that, whatever the causal origin, educational disadvantage among deprived 
children is malleable by policy intervention. 
This all has meant that the primary social agenda for the U.K. government has become 
tackling childhood deprivation. The Government is interpreting poverty not just as a 
manifestation of financial inequality, but as a factor creating material deprivation and inhibiting 
child development and educational attainment.  Thus, the anti-poverty agenda is part of a wider 
Opportunity Agenda (see HM Treasury, 1999a) which aims to reduce the incidence and severity 
of states or shocks that have long-term adverse repercussions for individuals (this is commonly 
called “scarring” in the U.K.).  This is why poverty here—although no specific target has been 
defined in the Government’s commitment to eliminate it—is not a simple relative income 
measure but a clear sense that childhood, for some, is an unfulfilling and damaging experience 
due to of a lack of financial resources in a household.  The Government is, therefore, ultimately   - 8 -
 
hoping to reduce income inequalities, but is also looking to reduce educational inequalities and a 
range of other damaging influences that affect children as they mature into adults.   
THE STRATEGY 
The policy response to child poverty and its consequences has three main components:  
(1) an increase in direct financial support; (2) a reduction of worklessness in households with 
children; and (3) the amelioration of long-term consequences. 
1.  Raise direct financial support for families with children, targeted on—but not exclusive 
to—low-income families 
The most immediate and obvious response to observed low incomes in many families 
with children is to increase the net transfers available through the tax and benefit system.  Up to 
and including the March 2000 Budget, an extra £7.2 billion (around £1000 per family with 
children in the U.K.) a year has been earmarked as increased financial support for families.  
Around a third of this increased expenditure for children has had the sole goal of reducing the 
relatively low incomes experienced by the poorest children.  However, in much of this agenda 
there are multiple goals for most policies, and so resources have not exclusively been focused on 
the poorest.   
These extra resources have been delivered through both expanded tax credits and cash 
transfers.   The tax credits include the Working Families’ Tax Credit, the Childcare Tax Credit, 
and the Children’s Tax Credit.  Increased transfer payments have come in Income Support 
benefit rates for children (these are mainly paid to workless families) and in the universal Child 
Benefit.  The details of this package are discussed extensively in the next section.  This child-
specific support has been buttressed by increased general support for low earners.  A National 
Minimum Wage (NMW)—Britain’s first—was established in 1999. Reforms to the National 
Insurance scheme (roughly equivalent to the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
programs in the U.S.) lowered costs for low-wage workers and their employers.  The starting rate 
of income tax was lowered from 20 to 10 percent which increases further take-home earnings in 
low-skilled entry-level jobs.  The fact that the NMW was set with a much lower rate for youths   - 9 -
 
(£3 per hour instead of £3.60p for adults aged 22+) means that it is more effectively targeted on 
adults, where the relationship between low earnings and low household income is stronger 
(Stewart, 1999).  
2.  Reduce the number of children living in workless households 
The second part of the strategy is to reduce the numbers of workless families with 
children.  Or—in terms of Figure INCDIST—to reduce the size of the spike that occurs 
someway below the standard poverty line.  This part of the strategy contains elements designed 
to improve the financial returns to employment, a reform of welfare administration to develop 
case management of the welfare dependent population, and improvements in childcare 
opportunities. 
The reform of tax and benefits described above was not neutral in its impact on the 
financial attractiveness of employment.  The package was deliberately slanted toward increasing 
the net gains from employment, or, in the jargon, to “making work pay.”  The reforms to the 
structure of the WFTC generally increased support for full-time or better-paid part-time work.  
For lower-paid, part-time lone parents, the improved incentives come mainly through the 
increased support for childcare costs in the Childcare Tax Credit.  More details are given in the 
next section. 
The New Deal employment strategy involves the development of a case management 
approach for welfare recipients.  This was already partially developed for those claiming 
unemployment-related benefits in the U.K., but has been extended substantially under the New 
Deal framework.  Nearly all welfare participants are now to be contacted by a Personal Adviser 
to establish if they want to work or participate in a program to improve job-readiness.  The New 
Deal for Lone Parents and the New Deal for Partners of the Unemployed are particularly relevant 
for families with children; these groups had previously been ignored in strategies to encourage 
employment.  The accompanying symposium papers by Jane Millar and Bruce Stafford discuss 
the New Deals in greater detail.   - 10 -
 
The National Childcare Strategy aims to create childcare opportunities for all those 
wishing to use them.  Such opportunities are most often missing in low-income and low-
employment areas.  Out-of-work parents, and especially out-of-work loan parents, identify the 
absence of available and affordable childcare as a major barrier to increasing employment 
(Finlayson and Marsh, 1998; Shaw et al, 1996).  The Childcare Tax Credit should help with the 
affordability of childcare, but the availability of reasonable quality childcare is very patchy in the 
U.K. So far the strategy consists of: a guaranteed half day place in a pre-school for 4 year olds 
(run by state schools who provide full-time schooling for 5 to 7 year olds), Early Excellence 
Centres and Neighbourhood Childcare Centres providing subsidized childcare in some of the 
poorest communities and encouragement for schools or Local Authorities to run After School 
Clubs and holiday play schemes. 
3.  Reduce incidence and severity of scarring factors from childhood and early adulthood 
The third major arm of the strategy is to try to reduce the impact of deprivation on 
educational attainment, and to limit the carry-over of social problems to adulthood.  There is a 
diverse range of initiatives targeted at key life-stages or events, generally originating from the 
Social Exclusion Unit (1998) attached to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office.  These cover teen 
pregnancy, children leaving social care, and homelessness among the young. In addition, a 
failure to connect to stable employment during the teenage years has been identified as causally 
leading to higher unemployment and lower wages in adulthood (Gregg, 2000, and Arulampalam, 
2000).  The New Deal for Young People aims to eliminate long-term youth unemployment, and 
to improve matching with sustained employment among youth.  Bruce Stafford provides more 
details in his symposium article.  Here we focus those directed at low educational attainment. 
On international assessments of comparable reading and math abilities among adults, the 
U.K.—along with the U.S.—has a high variation in standards and a large number of adults with 
low levels of literacy and numeracy (Layard, McIntosh and Vignoles, 2000).  Schools with high 
levels of child poverty among their pupils underachieve on school-leaving exams and generally 
have fewer pupils staying in education after the minimum leaving age of 16.  To what extent this 
underachievement is due to the teaching or the attendant problems the children bring with them   - 11 -
 
remains controversial.  Income itself can only be partially responsible for this low achievement, 
and, therefore, while improving incomes may help reduce this deficit, it also makes sense to 
address it directly.  Sure Start, school attainment in poor areas and Educational Maintenance 
Allowances (EMAs) make up an attempt to tackle this deficit from birth through to the end of the 
teenage years.   
Sure Start.  Sure Start is perhaps the most important of these initiatives so far.  In origin it 
is loosely motivated by the U.S. Head Start program (Currie and Thomas, 1995), but there are 
large differences in the details.  It is targeted on children aged 0 to 4 living in the most 
disadvantaged communities in the country.  It aims to promote physical, social, and emotional 
development of children, and hence to make them more ready to learn by the time they enter into 
school.  So far Sure Start programs operate in some 200 poor communities, but there are well-
developed plans for expansion.  These do not always overlap with the childcare centers 
mentioned above, but overlap and co-ordination of these quality childcare programs is increasing 
as they expand and they are increasingly acting as a coordinated intervention. 
Low educational qualifications on leaving school.  Successive governments have 
developed an extensive series of tests to assess child development through the education system. 
 These are undertaken at ages 7, 11 and 14.  Final examinations on leaving secondary school (the 
General Certificate of Secondary Education, always referred to as GCSEs) are undertaken at 16. 
 These tests are increasingly used to assess the value-added by a school, and to highlight under-
performance.  Schools have regular inspections by Government-appointed inspection teams, and 
failing schools may be closed or have their senior teaching staff replaced.  Local Authorities are 
also assessed for the support structures they supply, and, again, failing areas may lose local 
control and be replaced by private-sector management consortia.  So pupils, schools and Local 
Authorities are all placed under a near continuous assessment regime.  One of the key aims of 
this is to raise standards of achievement among the poorly performing tail of U.K. pupils and 
schools.  This is being supported by extra financial resources directed at children with greater 
learning needs rather than explicitly focused on poverty.     - 12 -
 
Educational Maintenance Allowance.  The exit from full-time compulsory education at 
age 16 produces a sharp discontinuity in education patterns between the third who cease full-
time education and the two thirds who normally go on until at least age 18.  Those dropping out 
are disproportionately those with fewer qualifications and those from less well-off families.  
Educational Maintenance Allowances—means-tested cash payments to children who continue in 
full-time education—are being piloted in a number of more disadvantaged districts.  They are 
designed to raise participation, retention and achievement in post-compulsory education.  Four 
different variants are being piloted with the maximum weekly payment ranging from £30 to £40 
per week subject to full attendance, plus retention bonuses each term (semester) and a final 
achievement bonus.  
The pilots are currently in the second of four years, and the evaluation of their results will 
focus on data collected on two cohorts of 16 year-olds in the years after they leave compulsory 
education compared with areas that are not operating the Educational Maintenance Allowances.  
So far, the evaluation has focused on whether the Educational Maintenance Allowances has 
affected participation, but it will go on to assess the impact on attendance and course completion 
as data emerges.  Ashcroft et al (2001) report that the Educational Maintenance Allowances 
increased participation amongst young people eligible for the full allowance—approximately one 
third of young people, with gross family incomes under £13,000—by around 7 percentage 
points. The increases in participation were lower for better-off young people eligible for less 
than the full amount, and the average effect over all young people eligible for some payment was 
an increase in participation of around 5 percentage points. More surprisingly perhaps, there 
appears to be no significant difference between paying the allowance to the young person or the 
mother. 
The U.K. strategy towards child poverty contains a large number of elements aimed at 
addressing financial poverty, employment and the adverse consequences of childhood 
deprivation.  The next section provides much greater detail about the financial-based reforms 
encompassing direct poverty alleviation and incentives to work.   - 13 -
 
FINANCIAL TRANSFERS TO FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 
The Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) has received the most press and analytical 
attention since 1998, but seeing it in isolation from the other reforms and increases in generosity 
of support for families with children is misleading.  These changes combine to form a systematic 
overhaul of the structure of financial transfers to the 7 million families and the 13 million 
children in the U.K.   Their inter-relationship is made clear in the Government’s announced plan 
to merge all the major parts of financial support for children into a new integrated child credit in 
2003 (HMT, 2000b), which we discuss more fully in the penultimate section.  
Before the 1998 budget, support for children came from four sources:  (1) a universal per 
child transfer (Child Benefit) normally paid to mothers; (2) extra payments in means-tested 
benefits (Income Support) normally paid to the household head in workless families; (3) a 
refundable tax credit for working families (Family Credit) paid to the mother; and (4) one of two 
related non-refundable tax credits available to an earner within a couple.  Starting with the 
March 1998 budget, the Government has increased the generosity of all four of these, and all but 
Child Benefit have undergone substantial structural change.  
The increases in the generosity of Child Benefit in the 1998 and 1999 Budgets together 
raised the real level of support by 27 per cent for the eldest child, with inflation-only increases 
for younger siblings. The increases in support for children in means-tested benefits has been 
focused on younger children:  Between April 1997 and 2001, weekly payments for children aged 
0-4 rose by £13.25 a week above inflation—a 73 percent real increase—and those with children 
aged 11-15 rose by £4.25 in real terms.  The result is that financial support for children up to age 
15 has been equalized—older children had previously received more generous support.  This 
reform partly reflects recognition by the Government that poverty rates were higher among 
families with younger children, and partly it facilitates the move to an integrated child credit, 
with its emphasis on simplicity and transparency.  
As in the U.S., Britain increasingly uses the tax system to target transfers to families with 
children.  The U.K. has an individual system of income tax.  Credits and allowances appear in a 
person’s tax schedule.  Employers use the schedules to assess and then deduct income tax   - 14 -
 
directly from paychecks. Allowances are typically less generous than in the U.S., so people start 
paying income tax at lower annual incomes (see Gale, 1997, and Brewer, forthcoming, for more 
comparisons of the U.S. and U.K. tax systems).  The new Children’s Tax Credit is a non-
refundable tax credit that replaces two mutually exclusive and equal-valued tax credits:  the 
Married Couple’s Allowance (MCA) and the Additional Person’s Allowance (APA).  The 
overall impact is that, since 1999, married couples without children have lost a tax break, and 
families with children, regardless of their marital status, have seen a tax break more than double 
in value.  The MCA and APA were available to all taxpayers, but the Children’s Tax Credit is 
withdrawn at 6.7 percent from people paying higher-rates of income tax (over £33,935 from 
April 2001), like the Child Tax Credit in the U.S. 
The Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) was an evolutionary reform to the existing 
in-work benefit, Family Credit.  It was announced in the Labour Government’s first full budget 
in spring 1998, and became available to claimants from October 1999.  The WFTC is available 
to families with children where any adult member is working 16 hours a week or more.  It 
consists of a per-family element—the same for couples and lone parents—and per-child 
elements.  There is a flat zone where the maximum award is paid, and the credit is phased-out 
beyond earnings of £92.90 a week at a rate of 55 per cent of after-tax income (this would be 
equivalent to a phase-out of 38 per cent of before-tax income for most WFTC claimants).  (We 
are deliberately using the U.S. phrase; U.K. studies call the phase-out rate the “withdrawal rate” 
or the “taper.”)  For a person on the basic-rate of income tax and paying National Insurance, this 
adds up to a total marginal deduction rate of 69 percent, a rapid rate of withdrawal compared to 
the combined phase-out faced by EITC claimants.   
WFTC differs in four major ways from its predecessor.  First, it is more generous, as both 
the family and the child elements have been increased.  For a family with one child, the WFTC is 
worth a maximum of £78.75 a week—or around $4,000 a year, substantially more than the 
EITC.  Each additional child raises the maximum credit by £25.60 a week.  But most of this 
increased generosity in the maximum value of the WFTC has been matched in the level of out-
of-work support, and so has by itself made little difference in the financial gain from moving 
from welfare to work.  Second, and more importantly for improving the financial reward to   - 15 -
 
work, families can earn more before support is withdrawn.  The maximum weekly earnings 
before withdrawal starts was raised from £80 a week under the old Family Credit system to 
£92.90.  Third, the phase-out rate was lowered from 70 to 55 percent of net of tax income.  These 
three changes have increased support for those in full-time or better paid part-time work (i.e. 
earning more than £92.90 a week) and extended eligibility to in-work support to a large number 
of families.  Lastly, the WFTC helps with childcare costs though a new Childcare Tax Credit, 
which pays parents 70 percent of childcare costs up to a (generous) maximum of £100 a week for 
1 child or £150 for more than 1 child.  The Childcare Tax Credit is restricted to households 
where all parents are in paid work, but lone parents are the prime beneficiaries to date.  This 
represents a substantial increase in generosity of support for childcare costs than the regime 
under Family Credit, which only offered a childcare cost disregard rather than a direct cash 
payment. 
The effect of these four changes is shown in Figure BUDCONa&b, which shows the 
previous (1997) and post-reform (the system as of March 2001 plus the indicative value of the 
Children’s Tax Credit at the time of writing) support packages for a couple with one child.  What 
is plotted is the increment in support from all four sources that comes, at each level of earnings, 
from having the child.  The increased generosity of the WFTC over the previous in-work benefit 
accounts for £2.7 billion of this £7.2 billion reform package total, with £2.5 billion going on the 
child payments in means-tested and universal benefits, and £1.8 billion on the Children’s Tax 
Credit (see HMT, 2000a). 
[Figure BUDCONa&b about here] 
The impact of the increased generosity of the WFTC and the Children’s Tax Credit is 
muted for those with medium to high rents.  Low-earning renters are eligible for rent support 
known as Housing Benefit (owner-occupiers normally get no housing support).  Housing Benefit 
is phased out as income rises, but at a faster rate than WFTC—65 percent, and starting at lower 
income level.  All low-income households (not just renters) can also apply for rebates for the 
local taxes in the U.K., which are assessed against property values.  This rebate—Council Tax 
Benefit—is administered alongside Housing Benefit, and phased out at an additional 20 percent. 
Unlike the Earned Income Tax Credit, WFTC counts as income when calculating Housing   - 16 -
 
Benefit or Council Tax Benefit, and so some households with children can be on multiple phase-
outs.  Under Family Credit, the maximum marginal deduction rate  (that is the combined effect 
of taxes and benefit phase-outs) could reach 97 percent.  However, the increased generosity of 
the WFTC compared to Family Credit has floated many households claiming in-work support off 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, and reduced the incidence of multiple phase-outs. 
This has virtually eliminated—or at least loosened—the worst of the poverty traps.  
The effect of the multiple phase-outs, and the effect of the increased generosity in WFTC 
is shown in Figure BUDCONHBa&b—the range of incomes (or rents) over which people are on 
both WFTC and Housing Benefit phase-outs has been sharply reduced. This comes at the cost of 
those on medium to high rents losing much of the increased value of WFTC in reduced Housing 
Benefit.  One third of recipients of the old Family Credit system also received Housing 
Benefit—the rest were either non-renters, or had rents low enough or incomes high enough to 
preclude support.  But families with children where no adult works are much more likely to be 
claiming Housing Benefit.  
[Figure BUDCONHBa&b about here] 
Comparison with the U.S. 
When the U.K. Government first announced that it was interested in reforming in-work 
support, it said it would examine “the advantages of introducing a new in-work tax credit for 
low-paid workers.  It would draw upon the successful experience of the American earned income 
tax credit, which helps reduce in-work poverty” (Hansard, 2 July 1997).  Even now, there is a 
strong political resonance between the WFTC and the EITC:  In the words of the respective 
political leaders, both support “hard-working families” and “reduce child poverty.”  A direct 
financial comparison between the WFTC and the EITC (see Brewer, forthcoming, and Appendix 
A) suggests that the U.K. system is substantially more generous, but this comparison can be 
misleading because the WFTC reduces entitlements to other benefits, whereas the EITC 
represents truly additional income.  But what is less often realized is that the structure and 
administrative details of the WFTC are quite different from the EITC, and almost wholly related 
to those that already existed in its predecessor, Family Credit.  For example, although the tax   - 17 -
 
authority in the U.K. (the Inland Revenue) administers the system, the WFTC has almost no 
direct connection to the rest of the tax system, unlike the EITC, and it does not operate as an 
annual tax rebate.  The size of the award is instead assessed on expected weekly earnings for 
new jobs; for claimants with stable jobs, it is calculated by looking at the past four paychecks 
(seven if paid weekly).  The WFTC is then paid at the same rate for 6 months, regardless of any 
changes in income (there is more detail in Appendix A).  
This desire to get money to claimants quickly—rather than waiting for the end of the tax 
year to pay the award—evident in the WFTC design is primarily motivated by two concerns.  
First, most taxpayers in the U.K. have their income tax correctly withheld by employers, and so 
do not file a tax return.  Second, people entering work on low wages would be worse off in work 
without the WFTC because the relatively high level of out-of-work benefits compared to the 
U.S. This means that the “real-time” work incentives are stronger than those provided by the 
EITC (Walker and Wiseman, 1997; Brewer, 2000). 
The WFTC and the EITC are not the only ways that the U.K. and U.S. governments 
support families with children.  In both countries, children are recognized in the benefit system, 
by in-work refundable credits, and by non-refundable tax credits or extra tax deductions or 
allowances. However, the vagaries of perception and political economy mean that these support 
systems are often presented from very different perspectives, and in consequence are difficult to 
compare.  In Figure COMP we summarize the two systems by comparing the full budget 
constraint—the relationship between gross income and income of taxes and benefits and welfare 
payments—for families with children in the U.K. in 1997 and March 2001 plus the indicative 
Children’s Tax Credit (before and after the implementation of the reforms discussed above) with 
that in the U.S. in 2000.   The U.K.’s system of financial support for children was broadly in line 
with that in U.S. at lower incomes prior to the current reforms, but the reforms have made it 
substantially more generous.  It is also more redistributive among families with children, with 
higher net tax rates at higher incomes than the U.S.  The U.S. system has been necessarily 
simplified:  These figures do not include state taxes, state EITCs or Medicaid; we include Food 
Stamps; and we have assumed the TANF system operating in Florida, a relatively low-benefit 
state (Committee on Ways and Means, 2000, p. 384).  (We choose Florida partly because the   - 18 -
 
state seems to include the median voter.)  Housing support and help with childcare costs are 
ignored in both countries.   
[Figure COMP about here] 
Figure COMP gives a representation of the total budget, but Figures KIDSUPa&b show 
the supports specifically dependent on children by calculating the cash difference in the budget 
constraints of a single person and a live-alone lone parent with 2 children.
3  In the U.K., financial 
support for children falls in cash terms as income rises, apart from the short phasing in of the 
non-refundable children’s tax credit.  This is not true in the U.S.:  First, the phase-in of the EITC 
gives a range where support increases with income at the lowest incomes. Second, after the EITC 
has been phased out, the value of the child exemptions and the head of household filing status 
increase with income.  A striking feature of the U.S. system is the trough after the EITC has been 
withdrawn and before the tax allowances and deductions increase in value (from around 
$50,000), discussed more in Ellwood and Liebman, 2000.  
[Figures KIDSUPa&b here] 
THE IMPACT OF THE REFORM PACKAGE 
Structural Change 
The reform package reduces child poverty, changes marginal deduction rates, and 
increases incentives to work.   
                                                 
 
3 So, for example, it does not show the full award of Food Stamps for a 3 person household, but the difference 
between a 1 person and 3 person household. The same applies for the U.K., except that we have assumed that the 
U.K. introduces an in-work credit for people without children, as announced in HMT, 2000b (so the picture is an 
underestimate of the position now). It is the approach used by Ellwood and Liebman (2000), who look at the tax 
treatment of U.S. families with children, and in Battle and Mendelson (2001), who compare systems of support in 
the U.K., U.S., Australia and Canada.   - 19 -
 
1.  Direct reduction of numbers of children below the poverty line 
Figure BUDGAINS shows which families have benefited the most from the extra money 
directed towards families with children in the past four years.  (Figure BUDGAINS does not 
analyse all budget measures; see Myck (2000) for a more comprehensive discussion.)  The use of 
relatively high phase-out rates for in-work and means-tested benefits means that the beneficiaries 
are heavily concentrated in the poorest households.  Households in the bottom two income 
deciles see disposable incomes rise by over 7 percent whereas families in the top three deciles 
gain by less than 1 percent.  Of course, the general focus on children in successive budgets 
means that these households are still gaining relative to households without children.    
[Figure BUDGAINS about here] 
The expected impact on relative poverty is relatively uncontentious, although the amount 
of income transfer actually realized is difficult to estimate.  At the time of writing, the latest 
official data are for 1998/9, pre-dating the major reforms, and therefore of little use.  Micro-
simulations from two different tax and benefit models project that measures up to those in the 
March 2000 budget will move over 1 million children out of relative poverty compared to a 
system where benefits were only increased in line with prices (Piachaud and Sutherland, 2000, 
and HM Treasury, 2000a).  Figure BUDDIST, drawn using the Treasury’s tax and benefit model, 
compares the situation in 1998 (prior to introduction of the measures addressed here) with a 
simulation of the picture after the measures introduced up to and including April 2001.  The 
figure does not include any changes in the distribution of pre-tax incomes:  The shift in the 
poverty line is entirely due to the substantial transfers to households in the past three Labour 
budgets.  These projections all imply that initial effect of the extra transfers to households is to 
move the hump in the income distribution for children to the right faster than the poverty line.
4  
                                                 
 
4 The Treasury’s model estimates the effect of different tax and benefit systems on the pre-tax and benefit income 
distribution in 2000. The estimate should therefore not be taken as a forecast change in the poverty rate, but as an 
estimate of what the tax and benefit reforms will achieve over-and-above any changes in the poverty rate due to   - 20 -
 
But, as pre-tax incomes will have risen—and probably grown more unequal—over the same 
period, it is likely that the actual decline in the poverty rate will turn out to be lower.   
[Figure BUDDIST about here] 
The gap between the peak of the spike and this poverty line has nearly been halved, but 
so far, only the leading edge of the spike has crossed the line.  This leading edge of the spike is 
mostly made up of working families, and so the poverty reduction to date is mostly among the 
working poor.  This suggests that further increase in financial support for children will do more 
to reduce the numbers with observed low incomes, because these increases reach beyond the 
working to the dependent poor.  The reform package also has the consequence of spreading the 
hump somewhat.  But these simulations do not allow for any behavioral changes from the 
reforms, and so do not capture the effects of any changes in work effort that might result.   
2.   Marginal deduction rates 
Marginal deduction rates for working families have also changed as a result of the WFTC 
reform.  The reduction in the headline phase-out rate from 70 percent to 55 percent and the fall 
in the number of families entitled to rent support have reduced the number of families on very 
high marginal deduction rates.  But the increased generosity of WFTC has increased the total 
numbers on any form of benefit phase-out.  Before the WFTC was introduced, around 750,000 
households had marginal deduction rates of over 70 percent, and 130,000 had rates over 90 
percent (see Table 1).  The WFTC reduced these numbers to 250,000 and 30,000 respectively, 
but the numbers on marginal deduction rates of 60 percent or more rose by nearly 200,000, to 
just under a million. This may be an acceptable tradeoff.  However, if the WFTC continues to 
expand further up the income distribution, the terms will rapidly deteriorate. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
                                                                                                                                                             
changes in the pre-tax income distribution.  The incomes presented are equivalised for family size, and the model 
estimates 60 percent median income to be around £170 a week for the reference family of a couple with no children 
(or a lone parent with two children).   - 21 -
 
The rates in Table 1 are above those in the U.S. because of the higher phase-out rates 
used in the U.K.  But there is a large discontinuity in the budget constraint in the U.K. as 
families become eligible for WFTC at 16 hours work a week, so work incentives are not 
universally worse in the U.K.  In fact, both countries seem to have good financial incentives for 
lone parents to do some work—assuming full take-up of all entitled benefits—but poorer 
incentives for lone parents to increase earnings beyond part-time or minimum-wage jobs 
(Brewer, 2000). 
3.  Improved incentives to work  
The WFTC, the Childcare Tax Credit, and the Children’s Tax Credit all combine to 
increase the financial returns to working rather than being on welfare. The intention is to induce 
entry into work, and so further reduce child poverty as a reduction in the number of children 
wholly or nearly-wholly supported by the state is probably vital if the numbers in child 
poverty—given the use of a relative definition—are to be reduced. We look first at the gain to 
taking a job and then the effect of increasing earnings once in work. 
Table 2 shows how the reforms have altered the financial gain to work—the difference in 
zero-income position on benefits and in-work income after taxes and benefits— for some 
benchmark families.  (These calculations ignore in-work costs, but we focus on the change in the 
gain to work, so this omission is not too problematic.)  The reforms have slightly improved the 
financial gain to work at 16 hours a week, but have had more of an impact on the incentive to do 
full-time work, particularly for lone parents (first row).  The Childcare Tax Credit supplement 
produces a large improvement in the (net of childcare costs) gain from moving to work for a lone 
parent paying £50 a week for childcare.  £50 a week childcare costs is slightly higher than the 
average of those currently claiming the Childcare Tax Credit. The negative aspect of the reforms 
is that a second earner in a family where the primary worker earns around £200 a week has seen 
a sharp drop in the financial incentive to work.  Such a person had the highest return to full or 
part-time employment in 1997 (apart from a lone parent with no rent and no childcare costs: a 
rare item), but in the 2001 scenario is closer to the other groups. The first wage in this stylized   - 22 -
 
two-earner family is sufficient to get the family off Housing Benefit, so housing tenure makes no 
substantial impact here.  
Table 2 also shows the relative gains of taking full or part-time work. The relative 
incentives to take full-time work have increased for all groups, mainly because of the lower 
phase-out rate, but this shift is particularly marked for workless couples.  Averaging across the 
population of workless families with children, adults who now take a job at realistic entry wages 
and hours will be able to keep an average of 5-6 percent more of their gross earnings than case 
under the pre-reform system  (HMT, 2000b). 
[Table 2 about here.]  
There has been a debate in the U.K. as to whether these changes in financial incentives 
will cause people to change their behavior.  Blundell et al, 2000, simulate the impact of the 
introduction of the WFTC (not the whole reform package) using a structural labor supply model. 
They predict that the WFTC will reduce workless households with children by just under 60,000 
(perhaps 100,000 children).  They also suggest that there will be some offsetting reduction of 
labor supply by women with working husbands.
5  The U.K. Government’s estimates are that the 
total package of reforms will encourage around 80,000 extra parents to enter work, a little more 
than twice the estimate in Blundell et al., 2000 for the WFTC alone (see HMT, 2000b).  These 
estimates use elasticities derived from data on labor market transitions using the methodology 
laid out in Gregg et al. (1999). But comparisons for the WFTC alone suggest the two 
methodologies give very similar results (Blundell and Reed, 2000).   
                                                 
 
5 The authors have benchmarked this model against labor supply estimates derived from past reforms to in-work 
benefits in the U.K. (Blundell, 2000 reviews this evidence) and believe it to be consistent.  The paper cited focuses 
solely on the WFTC reforms, which may prove to be a significant restriction, since the lower phase-out rate for the 
WFTC means that more of the income gains from the tax reductions introduced by the Government now feed 
through into net income gains for families compared to the old Family Credit.   - 23 -
 
Early Evidence  
The WFTC has been in operation for a year now, and the first evidence of its impact is 
beginning to emerge.  As of August 2000, there were 1.1 million claims for WFTC, 230,000 
more than for its predecessor in summer 1999, although it is not clear from administrative data 
how many of these new claims were from previously workless families (discussed by Blundell 
and Brewer, 2000).  The Spring 2000 Labor Force Survey (LFS)—administered on average 6 
months after the introduction of the WFTC in October 1999—shows a dramatic decline in the 
numbers of children living in workless families:  Between spring 1999 and spring 2000 this rate 
fell from 17.3 percent to 15.8 percent.  
Table 3 explores this evidence using a simple difference in difference methodology.  
There has been a strong employment recovery over the last few years in the U.K.  Between 
spring 1996 and 1999, the aggregate non-employment rate fell by 0.7 percentage points a year.  
It continued to fall between 1999 and 2000, but at a slightly lower rate.  The reduction in 
workless households with or without children looks very like the aggregate pattern prior to 1999. 
 Since then—coincident with the introduction of the WFTC—there has been a sharp increase in 
the rate of decline for households with children.  On an unadjusted difference-in-difference 
basis, Table 3 suggests that the WFTC and associated changes have already reduced the number 
of workless households with children by half a percentage point, or around 40,000.  On a per 
child basis, the change since the introduction of the WFTC has been more dramatic.    
[Table 3 about here]. 
The bulk of the change has been among lone parents.  Lone parents in the U.K. have for a 
long time had very low employment rates.  From the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, employment 
rates for lone mothers were broadly stable at just above 40 per cent, even though over the same 
period, employment among mothers with working husbands rose sharply (Desai et al., 1999; 
Blundell and Hoynes, forthcoming). Since 1993 the numbers of lone parents living in workless 
households has started to fall.  The decline in lone parent workless households between 1996 and 
1999 (penultimate row of Table 3) was over a percentage point a year.  In the last year, however, 
there has been a sharp 3 percentage point fall.   - 24 -
 
We use the LFS to investigate this improvement in employment among lone parents 
further.  Following Eissa and Liebman (1996) we use single (live-alone) adults without children 
as a comparison group to (live-alone) lone parents, and look at how employment rates among 
those with similar age and education are performing in the labor market.  We compare the pre-
reform period 1997-99 with the post-reform 1999-2000 period (1996 data with weights 
consistent with those used in subsequent years had yet to be re-released at the time of writing). 
Table 4 suggests that the raw differential in increased employment rates among lone parents 
since the introduction of the WFTC is still significant when we control for the age of child and 
use single adults of a similar age and education as a comparison group.  The results suggest that 
a combination of the buoyant labor market and an older profile of the children drove the 
improving employment rates of lone parents in 1997-99.  Since 1999 however, there has been 
acceleration in employment growth for lone parents coincident with the policy shift that is not 
consistent with employment growth among the childless with similar characteristics.  Indeed, the 
adjusted results are quite similar to the unadjusted differences. Hence it appears that lone parents 
have had an exceptional increase in employment rates over this period and this could reflect 
responses to financial incentives, increased advertising that occurred when the new policy was 
implemented, or some combination of both.    
[Table 4 about here.] 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
All three of the main areas of policy development described in section 2 continue in 
development.  Two particular policy proposals, for expanded case management and greater 
system integration, would profoundly change the picture of the U.K.’s welfare system. 
ONE, and the Expansion of Case Management in the Welfare System 
ONE (a name, not an acronym) is a tag used by the Government to describe the 
unification of administration systems for different out-of-work working-age benefits.  In 
practice, this means that, over time, all benefit claimants will get regular contact with a personal 
advisor (case manager), where the regularity varies according to which benefit people are on.  So   - 25 -
 
far this is only compulsory for the unemployed; disabled workers and lone parents have 
voluntary programs under the New Deals.  This is changing; in the future all claimants will have 
a compulsory “work-focused interview” at regular intervals.  Here, the personal advisor asks 
about a person’s desire to work and the inhibiting factors.  Claimant groups will have different 
job-search requirements, but similar support systems will be available to all, whatever benefit 
they are on, if they want them.  This reform places work at the heart of the welfare 
administration process for all groups, whereas currently the unemployed are clearly given a 
higher priority.  It also means that benefit advisors will not have implicit incentives to push 
people onto other benefits.  All groups will have readily available job-search support systems.  
The case management will not just help with job search, but will cover issues of transition in the 
benefit system and access to care services for dependants as well.   
This development follows from the New Deal framework of contacting a wide benefit 
groups to discuss, promote and support a transition into employment (see the paper by Stafford 
for a discussion).  The main difference is that this will be embedded routinely in the benefit 
administration, and attending the “work focused interview” is compulsory.  It falls a long way 
short, though, of compulsory job search or time limits on welfare receipt.    
An Integrated Child Credit 
The integrated child credit is another unifying reform, but one affecting the tax and 
benefit system rather than the administration regime.  The aim is to pull together all of the 
financial support for children that is currently paid through welfare payments, in-work benefits 
and tax credits into a single instrument, with the same rules and administration.  This integrated 
child credit has many more similarities with the Canadian Child Tax Benefit than with the U.S. 
system.  Payments in respect of adults in Income Support and the WFTC will remain outside this 
system, and, at the same time as the integrated child credit is introduced, in-work support will be 
extended to adults without children, probably with restrictions to full-time employment and an 
age limitation of over 21 or over 24 for the childless. 
A pictorial representation of how the benefit system could change with the advent of the 
integrated child credit is shown in Figure ICC.   - 26 -
 
[Figure ICC about here] 
The three support systems that are pulled together into a new single system remain 
nominally distinct from the universal Child Benefit, but in practical terms—who receives the 
payment, and how it is paid—they will be identical.  Neither the value of the credit, nor details 
of how it will be administered had been announced at the time of writing.  If it were based on the 
current payment structures, it would mean a per-family payment (with a maximum value of 
around £442 a year) and a per-child payment (with a maximum value of around £1,500).  The 
extra payments for childcare costs maybe included too.  It would then be partially withdrawn at 
moderate incomes (£5-15,000 pa) at 38 percent of gross income, and fully withdrawn at higher 
incomes (over £35,000) at 6.7 percent of gross income.  
This system will have a number of new features.  First, all payments will be paid to the 
mother (or the main care-giver).  Under the current system, this depends on which benefit is 
being paid and even how the payment is being made.  Second, income uncertainty at the time of 
transitions into and out of work will be reduced, as there will be a stable platform of financial 
support for children across the welfare-to-work divide, rather than the uncertainly (and possible 
delay) of moving from out-of-work benefits to in-work benefits.  Third, payments will be 
assessed against family income throughout, presumably on a constant definition of income.  This 
represents the most significant step towards joint assessment for families with children since 
income tax became individualized in 1990.  The way it responds to changes in income and 
circumstances—much of which remains undecided at the time of writing—will also be crucial 
(see Brewer, Myck and Reed, 2001, for more details of the background to the reform and some 
of the options).  
CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT 
While the U.K. Government’s strategy contains many of the main elements of U.S. 
welfare to work agenda—such as increased financial incentives and case management of the 
welfare caseload to support transition into work—it also has substantial differences.  The most 
striking are:   - 27 -
 
•  Levels of welfare support for those not in work—as well as those in work—are rising 
substantially.  
•  There is no time-limiting of welfare support nor a requirement to seek work for lone mothers 
(sanctions only apply to those claiming unemployment benefits who do not meet their 
responsibilities to look for work and accept appropriate job offers). 
•  The strong emphasis on tackling poverty and its consequences for children. 
At some stage the government will have to declare its position on what it means by 
elimination of child poverty.  Elimination of poverty on a high relative income measure is almost 
impossible. The best European Union countries, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, have child 
poverty rates (on a 50 percent of mean income before housing costs basis) of a little under 5 
percent (Bradbury and Jantii, 1999).   Measurement error and lumpiness of income over the short 
windows used to assess income in the U.K. data will always leave some people below such a 
benchmark.  
The Government has a number of sensible ways forward.  It could assert that such 
imprecise data means that an estimated child relative poverty rate of 5 per cent is consistent with 
its intention to eliminate child poverty.  Alternatively it could focus on a measure of material 
deprivation or some combination of a relative income and material deprivation measure, as used 
by the Irish government.  A reliance on relative income will require large resources to be 
committed to supporting children, and child support systems to rise in line with median incomes 
thereafter.  This is difficult, but not impossible, as many European countries, especially in 
Scandinavia, have not seen the substantive rise in relative child poverty rates over the past 2 or 3 
decades experienced by the U.K. (Micklewright and Stewart, 2000). It is clear from Government 
publications however (e.g. HMT, 1999b or DSS, 2000b), that the intended target is larger than a 
simple financial measure.  As a result, it is likely that the measures ultimately adopted to assess 
success will include some indicators of material well-being.   
The strategy is, however, clearer than the target.  The Government has substantially 
raised financial support for families with children.  Increased payments have been focused on 
low-income families, whether they are working or not, but all families with children have gained   - 28 -
 
something under the Government’s package of reforms.  Work incentives have risen, especially 
for full-time work, and those lifted out of poverty to date are much more likely to be working.  
Increasing the financial rewards for work at low wages is part of a wider strategy to reduce the 
number of children living in workless households.  This part of the strategy would appear vital if 
the costs of eliminating childhood poverty are not to prove prohibitive.  Here there are some 
early signs of improvement, with the number of children in workless households down from 19.4 
percent in 1996 to 15.8 percent in spring 2000—and this improvement happening 
disproportionately after the WFTC came into effect in late 1999.  There have also been 
substantial reforms to the way welfare is administered to support transitions into work.  The most 
important is the development of a case management approach, with all claimants having a 
personal advisor.  The final part of the strategy is to reduce the extent to which children from the 
poorest households and communities do less well in terms of development and education.  This 
involves a mixture of extra resources and focusing the machinery of government and service 
delivery on out-turns among the poorest children.  All elements of this strategy are evolving, and 
further steps have already been announced or proposed.  
The intention is commendable, and the strategy coherent, but the scale of the task so 
large that many argue that it is unachievable.  Some cynics suggest the Government has little 
intention of achieving it.  The central problem is the large financial transfers required to reduce 
poverty on a relative income basis, especially if recent reductions in worklessness do not 
continue.  The increased work incentives are certainly not substantial enough alone to drastically 
reduce the numbers in such workless households, and hence the strategy relies heavily on the 
reforms to welfare administration and increased childcare availability to facilitate moves back to 
work.  Increased generosity of support in and out of work may actually reduce the desire for 
work through an income effect, as life without work becomes more tolerable at these higher 
income levels.  This may mean that there is growing pressure to adopt compulsion for lone 
parents and partners of workless men to search for and accept work.  However, time-limited 
welfare payments to the workless, or the application of sanctions to those who do not comply to 
compulsory requirements, may create a small group in acute poverty and undermine a claim of 
having eliminated child poverty.  Increased generosity of support will also mean that the high 
withdrawal rates cover an ever-expanding section of the population.  This could be reduced by   - 29 -
 
greater use of the universal, or near universal, parts of the child support system, but at a large 
extra cost.   
In addition, there are problems establishing exactly what the impact of financial 
resources are on child development outcomes, and even more problems designing and 
implementing successful interventions.  In mainstream policy areas, Britain has not developed as 
strong an experimental and evaluation culture as the U.S.  Nor has it developed systematic 
mechanisms by which evidence influences policy on the ground.  This becomes all the more 
difficult where policy allows for significant local inputs and choices.  
On a more up-beat note, if interventions and reduce financial distress lead to fewer teen 
pregnancies or people with very low levels of literacy, then fewer parents in the next generation 
will suffer as acute problems earning and supporting their families. This intergenerational 
transmission aspect of deprivation is very important in government thinking. The ambition of 
this program will be perhaps surprise American readers, and it seems unlikely to us that such 
ambition would be ever attempted in the U.S. It is perhaps interesting, however, to think briefly 
about whether it should be.   - 30 -
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Working Families Tax Credit 
(as of June 2000) 
Earned Income Tax Credit (2000) 
Eligibility 
Eligibility  Must work more than 16 hours 
a week, have dependent 
children (under 16 or under 19 
and in full-time education), 
have less than £8,000 capital. 
Couples need to claim jointly; 
need not be married.  
Extension to those without 
dependent children proposed 
alongside an integrated child 
credit. 
Must have positive earnings in past year 
and annual investment income under 
$2,350.  
Married couples need to file a joint tax 
return, unmarried couples file separately. 
Parents need to have a “qualifying” child 
(either theirs or their spouse’s, or any 
other child that was cared for all year). 
“Children” are under 19 or under 24 and 
a student, or permanently and totally 
disabled.  
Where a child potentially qualifies two 
unmarried adults for EITC, only the adult 
with the highest income can apply (this 




Credit is weekly. 
Basic credit of £53.15 plus 
possible 30 hour credit of 
£11.25 plus credits for each 
child at £25.60 or £26.35 for 
16-18s.  
Childcare tax credit is 
supplementary to this. 
Credit is annual and is a fraction of 
annual income up to a maximum level of 
$353/$2,353/$3,888 for families with no, 
1, or more than 1 children.    - 36 -
 
Tapering  Beyond threshold of £91.45, 
tapered at 55 percent. 
Phase-in threshold applies a 7.65% 
/34%/40% credit (for no, 1, more than 1  
children) to income until maximum credit 
reached.  Beyond threshold of $12,690 
($5,770 for no children), tapered at 
7.65%/15.98%/21.06% so that runs out at 
$10,380/$27,413/$31,152. 
Interaction with other parts of tax and benefit system 
Definition 
of income 
Net income (i.e. income after 
income tax and national 
insurance). 
Self-employed: same 
definition of “income” as for 
other tax liabilities. 
Gross earnings or “modified adjusted 
gross income” if “modified adjusted 
gross income” is higher and claimant is 
on the taper (“modified adjusted gross 
income” is income minus standard 
deductions for tax purposes). 
Self-employed: same definition of 





Child Benefit, Statutory 
Maternity Pay, Attendance 
Allowance, maintenance 
payments, Housing Benefit 
and Council Tax Benefit 
awards 




Housing Benefit and Council 
Tax Benefit awards 
Federal law prohibits EITC to be treated 
as income for purpose of Medicaid, SSI, 
Food Stamps and low-income housing. 
Since 1991, EITC did not count for 
AFDC assessment; States can now count 
EITC when determining TANF awards.  
Assessment and payment mechanism 
Assessment  Assessed on average weekly 
income in “assessment period” 
prior to claim. Length of 
“assessment period” depends 
on frequency of claimant’s 
earnings: 7 weeks for weekly 
payments, 8 weeks for 
fortnightly, 16 weeks for 4-
weekly, 4 months for monthly 
payments. Estimated earnings 
Assessed at year-end on past year’s 
income.   - 37 -
 
used for new workers. 
Payable  Weekly award fixed for 26 
weeks (unless family status 
changes). 
Paid through wage packet 
unless non-earner in couple 
elects to receive it or if self-
employed. Timing of payments 
aligned with timing of wages, 
so if worker paid monthly in 
arrears, credit will be paid 
monthly in arrears. 
Non-earners paid fortnightly.  
Annual award is a refund on annual tax 
liability with any excess paid as a lump-
sum. Families have to file by April 15 
each year. 
Up to $1,418 can be paid in advance 
through the wage packet for claimants 
that have federal income tax withheld 
from wages. Few elect for this option. 
Paid to  Couples decide who receives 
it. If couple cannot agree, then 
Inland Revenue will probably 
pay to the main carer. 
Married couples who claim the EITC 
have to file a joint tax return. Their EITC 
credit reduces the joint tax liability. They 
nominate who receives the payable part 
of the credit.  
See “eligibility” for other rules on who 
can claim in non-married couples. 
Source: Brewer (forthcoming).    - 38 -
 
Table 1. Number of families facing high marginal deduction rates before and after the 
reforms 
Thousands of families  Before the 1998 
budget 
After the 2000 budget  Difference 
100% and over  5 0 -5 
90% and over  130 30  -100 
80% and over  300 210 -90 
70% and over  740 250 -490 
60% and over  760 950 +190 
Source: from HM Treasury, 2000a. 
Notes: A marginal deduction rate is the percentage of the marginal pound of income that is lost in taxes 
and withdrawn benefits or tax credits. 
   - 39 -
 
Table 2. The effect of the reforms on the financial gain to work for parents with children   
Gain to work (£) 
16 hours  35 hours 
1997 2001 1997 2001 
Not on HB 
 Lone  parent  57  60  96  115 
  Couple with children  30  33  65  82 
  Couple with children, 1 
  earner working 35 
  hours/week @ £6/hour 
44 30  102  65 
 Single  person  13  13  64  70 
With HB    
 Lone  parent  31  32  51  68 
  Couple with children  14  14  30  35 
  Single person, no 
 children 
6 7  25  30 
With childcare of £50/week    
 Lone  parent  15  48  81  100 
Notes: Table measures difference between zero-income benefit income and income after taxes 
and benefits in work. Assumes 2 children under 11 and full take-up of all entitled benefits, 
hourly wage of £4.20.  Childcare costs of £50 a week is slightly more than the average of those 
lone parents currently claiming the Childcare Tax Credit.  Both tax and benefit systems have 
been indexed to 2000 prices.   
Source: authors’ calculations based on TAXBEN model. 
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Table 3: Annual Changes in Employment Rates among Live-Alone Lone Parents 1997-99 
and 1999-2000    
Period  Raw Annual Changes  Adjusted for comparable 
single adults and age of 
youngest child 
1997-1999  1.598 0.004 
1999-2000  3.138 1.807 
Difference  1.540 1.803 
Note: Column 3 is the difference in employment growth rates between comparable lone parents 
and single adults with in the two periods. They have been estimated from probit equations of 
employment status controlling for  year, age 18-24, 25-34, 35-44 (45+ as the base), qualifications 
of degree level or equivalent, A level but below degree, O level or equivalent and below O level 
(no qualifications is the base).  Gender and gender and age, qualification interactions and 
dummies for age of youngest child being 0-1, 2-4, 5-10 and 11-14 are also included (15+ as the 
base).  The marginal effects reported are the transformed coefficients on a year/lone parent 
interaction for the two periods.  
Source: Labor Force Survey.   - 41 -
 
Table 4: Differences of Trends in Household Employment Patterns Before and After the 
Introduction of the WFTC 
      (1)    (2)   (2)-(1)   
Percentage point change (per year in 1996-99  1999-2000 
Non-employment race         -0.7    -0.6     0.1 
Workless Households with: 
 No  Children     -0.5    -0.4     0.1 
 Children     -0.7    -1.2   -0.5 
 
Children  in  Workless  Households   -0.7    -1.5   -0.8 
Lone  Parents  Households    -1.3    -3.0   -1.8 
Couple with Children     -0.6    -0.5    
0.1 
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2000.   
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Figure INCDIST: Kernel Density Representation of Income Distributions of Households 








Weekly Income by Presence of Children, 1968

















Weekly Income by Presence of Children,1996







Source: Family Expenditure Survey. Vertical lines are poverty cutoffs at 60% median income 
after housing costs equivalised for family size. Figures exclude pensioner households. 
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Note: Assumes entitlement for WFTC reached at £59.20, or 16 hours work at the minimum wage. Values uprated to 2001-2  prices.
 













































Working Families' Tax Credit
Income support
Child benefit
Note: Assumes entitlement for WFTC reached at £59.20, or 16 hours work at the minimum wage. Uses the tax and benefit system as of March 2001, plus the indicative 
value of the Children’s Tax Credit at the time of writing.  
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Note: Assumes entitlement for WFTC reached at £59.20, or 16 hours work at the minimum wage. Values uprated to 2001-2  prices.
 
Figure BUDCONHBb. System of support for families with children with Housing 

















































Working Families' Tax Credit
Income support
Child benefit
Note: Assumes entitlement for WFTC reached at £59.20, or 16 hours work at the minimum wage. Uses the tax and benefit system as of March 2001, plus the indicative 
value of the Children’s Tax Credit at the time of writing.  
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UK (after the 
reforms)
US
UK (before the 
reforms)
Note: Assumes live-alone lone parent, 2 children under 11. Does not include housing or childcare support or costs. UK lone parent has wage of £4.20. All values 
converted at £1: $1.50. Does not include state-level taxes or EITCs. Assumes Florida's TANF system. "Before the reforms":system as of April 1997. After the reforms: 
M h 2001 l th i di ti Child ' T C dit  - 46 -
 



















































Notes: compares support through tax and benefit system for live-alone lone parent with 2 children and single person. Uses March 2000 tax and benefit system plus indicative Children's Tax Credit, but 
also assumes an in-work tax credit available to those without children. WFTC eligibility begins at annual equivalent of 16 hours/week work at £4.20/hour.  




















































Dependent child tax exemptions
Head of household tax allowance
Food Stamps
Notes: compares support through tax and benefit system for live-alone lone parent with 2 children and single person. Assumes TANF system in Florida but ignores state-level 
EITCs and taxes.
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Note: shows impact of changes in Child Benefit, WFTC and Children's Tax Credit on income of households with children
Source: calculated using TAXBEN, the IFS' tax and benefit model, and drawn from Brewer, Myck and Reed (2001).  
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1997 tax and benefit system
2001 tax and benefit system
Change in 60% 
median income
Note: Shows modelled impact of reforms on the estimated 2000-1 income distribution for families with children. Assumes full take-up of benefits and tax credits.
Source: figures provided by HM Treasury.  
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Note: Assumes entitlement for employment tax credit reached at £59.20, or 16 hours work at the minimum wage. Values deflated to 2001-2  prices.
 